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ABSTRACT
Social networking sites are starting to provide users with ser-
vices that expose information about their audiences’ compo-
sition and behavior, such as LinkedIn’s ‘Who’s viewed my
profile’ feature. Providing information about content viewers
to content publishers, however, raises new privacy concerns
for viewers themselves, possibly creating a chilling effect on
viewer behavior.
We report on a study of 718 respondents using Mechanical
Turk across two surveys to study publishers’ (N=402) use and
expectations of information about their viewers, and viewers’
(N=316) privacy behaviors and concerns in the face of such
visibility. Our findings indicate that publishers are generally
mindful of viewers’ privacy; viewers engage in various self-
censorship behaviors in the face of visibility; and in some
cases (e.g., dating sites) significant gender differences ex-
ist about what information respondents felt should be shared
with publishers and required of viewers.
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ACM Classification Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Online services are beginning to enable content publishers to
learn details about who is viewing and interacting with their
content; e.g., LinkedIn provides information about who has
viewed one’s profile [24] (Figure 1). This visibility raises
new and interesting questions about the privacy of the view-
ers and the degree to which publishers desire this informa-
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Figure 1: Example of LinkedIn’s ‘Who’s viewed my profile’ feature.
tion.1 Given the visibility of their actions, viewers need to
manage the image they present to publishers [9, 37]. This,
in turn, may motivate publishers to attempt to strike a bal-
ance between information transparency and viewer privacy.
A deeper understanding of the extent to which viewers need
and expect privacy when online will help balance the privacy
and utility needs of both publishers as well as viewers.
The trend toward greater transparency of viewers’ actions is
not surprising. The lack of information about who is view-
ing one’s content can make it challenging for publishers to
adapt their content to their audience and lead to publisher
privacy concerns. Without an understanding of their audi-
ence, publishers may post information to an unintended set
of users [41], potentially leading to lost jobs [8], embarrass-
ment [42], or unfair treatment [30]. These issues have led
to a significant amount of research on privacy management
in social networks [2, 5, 12]. Recent work explores the con-
cept of providing ‘exposure feedback’ to publishers, making
available data about how and when other people view their
information [32].
Providing exposure feedback to content publishers enables
them to better manage their privacy [4, 21] but comes at the
potential loss of privacy to viewers. When forced to expose
their identity, people experience greater pressure to conform
1We refer to publishers as those people who post their profiles on-
line and viewers as those who read the profiles.
to social norms, leading to less risk taking and lower cre-
ativity [37]. Possibly recognizing viewers’ potential concerns
about their privacy, LinkedIn provides alternatives to disclos-
ing one’s identity when viewing other users’ profiles: namely,
users can instead choose to appear as anonymous or simply
display general characteristics about their profile [22]. Users
are, however, restricted to the same level of feedback about
visits to their own profile.
Despite the benefits to publishers, providing exposure feed-
back may have a chilling effect on viewer behavior and re-
duce the overall utility of the social network as a safe space to
explore others’ profiles and information within certain bound-
aries. Yet there is little understanding of why and when view-
ers desire privacy, and how features providing exposure feed-
back impact viewer behavior. Further, although publishers
may find information about their viewers useful, they may not
necessarily feel that this information should be required. We
believe that exploring these issues will lead to better design of
exposure feedback mechanisms that balance the privacy and
information needs of both the publishers and viewers, lead-
ing to a safer online exchange of information. Specifically,
we focus on the following two questions:
R1: How do publishers currently make use of information
about their viewers, and how do viewers modify their be-
haviors to manage their privacy? It is not currently under-
stood how and why information about viewers is actually
being used by publishers, or whether such exposure feed-
back has had a chilling effect on viewers. This may shed
light on why people desire such privacy and can inform
mechanism design for enhancing the privacy of viewers.
R2: To what degree a) do publishers find various attributes of
viewers ‘useful’; b) do publishers believe these attributes
should be ‘required’; and c) are viewers comfortable re-
vealing these attributes? We seek to understand how peo-
ple feel about disclosing a range of personal characteris-
tics (e.g., name, age, or gender) in two specific contexts
(dating and social networking), and to what degree such
information is desirable to publishers. These preferences
can inform the design of mechanisms for enhancing the
privacy of viewers and also shed light on the tension be-
tween the information needs of publishers and the privacy
requirements of viewers.
We wanted to consider viewer privacy behaviors in an on-
line interaction situation that supports reciprocal visibility,
i.e., where a user as a viewer shares the same information
with publishers as the user is able to access about their own
viewers. LinkedIn was selected because it is a popular pro-
fessional networking site and is also used to connect with po-
tential contacts who may not yet be well known to the user.
To this end, we surveyed 718 participants using Amazon Me-
chanical Turk across two surveys: one ‘publisher focused’
(N=402) and one ‘viewer focused’ (N=316).
Our findings suggest: (i) users avoid viewing information on
LinkedIn because of viewer privacy concerns and do so for
several reasons including ‘impression management’; (ii) pub-
lishers make use of information about their viewers in various
ways, such as by researching their viewers but show a concern
for the privacy of viewers by indicating that only some types
of information should be ‘required’ in common social net-
working contexts; (iii) viewers are willing to share personal
information with publishers depending on the context (such
as dating) and significant gender differences exist. For exam-
ple, women viewers are less comfortable sharing certain in-
formation, but women publishers feel that more information
should be required to be shared.
RELATED WORK
Interpersonal Boundary Management
People manage interpersonal boundaries to influence how
they are perceived by others in various situations [9]. This
can done by controlling what information other people re-
ceive, but it can also be about showing respect for others
and genuine attempts to highlight ones’ most relevant fea-
tures. This boundary management is continuous and ongoing
as people negotiate over time what information is disclosed to
others and under which circumstances, such as in the balance
between home and work lives. People intermingle them by
placement of photos of children on desks while also creating
strong barriers by wearing different clothing [29].
One way people negotiate boundaries and impressions is
through ‘signaling’. Placing a photo of a child on a desk, for
example, signals in a quiet way that the person has a child and
that this knowledge is public. Signaling allows people to pro-
vide information about themselves so that others can, in turn,
take that information into account when making decisions or
presenting information about themselves. This type of subtle
signal is commonly known as a ‘weak signal’. Information
is provided through a side channel where it can be either fol-
lowed up on or ignored. Weak signals can be powerful in
facilitating human interaction by providing a non-explicit in-
vitation to follow-up on a topic. Bapna et al. studied a dating
website that showed people a list of everyone who had viewed
their profile (weak signal of interest) and then provided some
users with the ability to view profiles without appearing on
the list. People who could be anonymous viewed far more
profiles but were less likely to find a romantic match due to
their inability to leave weak signals [3]. On LinkedIn, the
presence of trust and signaling has shown that it is influential
in determining who joins a user’s network [7].
Exposure Feedback
Completely hiding everything about oneself seems tempt-
ing from a privacy perspective. An anonymous person can
browse the internet without risk of judgment from others and
can therefore be less inhibited and view content that they
might not want others to know they have viewed [3, 27].
However, this anonymity means that content authors know
little about their audience and may be unable to adapt con-
tent appropriately. Authors also have to be more conserva-
tive when publishing content to unknown audiences as they
have no way of knowing the make-up of the audience or how
the audience will react to it [9]. Forcing people to be visi-
ble, however, tends to have a chilling effect on their behavior
where they are less willing to explore for fear of giving unin-
tentional signals to others. Thus a balance is needed between
publishers’ and viewers’ demands.
Some researchers have explored ‘exposure aware’ systems
that provide more feedback about how one’s information is
accessed. For example, Tsai et al. propose an audit-log inter-
face where users can review specific information about who
requested their location and when at the end of the day [39].
As an alternative to such detailed information, Schlegel et
al. propose an intuitive interface to aggregate and display the
frequency of accesses by various classes of viewers [35] pro-
viding some degree of privacy to viewers. In general, these
systems can provide information about viewers; however, it
is not clear how such transparency affects the viewers.
Reciprocity
Other related approaches to address the asymmetry of in-
formation exchange between publishers and viewers demand
‘reciprocity’ from viewers of data, e. g. ‘tit for tat’ pri-
vacy settings in which users requesting someone’s location
must provide their own location in return [25]. LinkedIn fea-
tures such a policy for exposure feedback about one’s view-
ers — publishers can see who has viewed their profile only if
they are willing to let others know when they have viewed
other publishers’ profiles [23]. Access controls providing
reciprocity have recently begun to gain attention in the ac-
cess control space, particularly in scenarios where multiple
stakeholders with competing interests own content [13, 36].
Data Aggregators
Although the privacy issues of showing information about hu-
man viewers to human publishers have been minimally stud-
ied in social networks, extensive research has gone into study-
ing the automated tracking of human viewers on webpages [6,
10, 17, 18, 19, 40]. The default setting on most servers is
to create logs that track information about visitors such as
IP address, browser type, referrer information, and the page
visited. Services such as Google Analytics [11] that provide
webpage owners with the ability to view information about
webpage viewers are very popular and are used by 92% of
the top websites [10], suggesting that publishers like to know
information about their audiences. Companies also like to
know who is viewing their pages; the majority of websites
track their viewers and provide personal information to third-
party data aggregators [6, 17]. Even prominent US govern-
ment websites such as HealthCare.gov track viewers and send
their personal information, such as pregnancy status to third
parties [33].
Users view the collection of information about them by web-
sites as potentially harmful and want them to ask before col-
lecting such data [10]. One of the most visible uses of viewer
information has been Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA)
where information is used to select advertisements that are in-
dividually tailored to a viewer’s interests. People have mixed
opinions when informed about OBA; some consider it poten-
tially useful while others consider it “creepy” or “scary” [40].
The type of data shared, length of retention, and page context
are all factors in viewers’ willingness to share information.
Viewers are more willing to share general information (e.g.,
operating system or browser) than more personal information
(e.g., address or income). They also prefer to share informa-
tion with entertainment sites and avoid sharing with banking
and dating sites [19].
METHOD
The study consisted of two online surveys focused on un-
derstanding respondents’ privacy concerns when using social
networking systems that provide content publishers with in-
formation about content viewers. Although we considered
using one survey for both viewers and publishers, there was
concern that respondents would be primed by one section
when answering the other and that the length would reduce
the quality of our responses. To mitigate these concerns,
the surveys were split into one asking questions from the
viewer’s perspective, while the second survey focused on the
publisher’s perspective. Both surveys were conducted us-
ing the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service [1]. Al-
though these surveys asked questions about both LinkedIn
and Facebook Messenger behaviors, this paper does not re-
port on Facebook Messenger as it is a different kind of ser-
vice from LinkedIn. We will report on Facebook Messenger
in future work.
Survey Instrument
We began with the actions that LinkedIn allows (e.g. connect-
ing, blocking, viewing) as well as actions that are automati-
cally taken for the user (e.g. emailing, suggesting contacts).
We brainstormed common reasons for avoiding or disclos-
ing information based on existing impression management
research [4, 9, 29, 40]. A pilot was performed to test and
refine options, leading to the final survey instrument. It was
divided into four sections focusing on: 1) consent form and
demographics; 2) questions related to privacy behaviors on
LinkedIn as a viewer or publisher; 3) questions related to pri-
vacy behaviors on Facebook Messenger as a viewer or pub-
lisher; and 4) privacy attitudinal questions related to different,
hypothetical contexts as a viewer or publisher. All respon-
dents saw the survey in the same order.
Demographics
The first section included demographic questions about age,
gender, nationality, number of people in the household, edu-
cation, ethnic background, and how long they had been using
LinkedIn and Facebook.
Behaviors on LinkedIn
Respondents were asked about their viewer-privacy behav-
iors and beliefs, including questions about both the available
settings and their current settings. The viewer survey asked
whether and why viewers had ever avoided viewing profiles
or messages because of privacy concerns. The publisher sur-
vey asked whether and how publishers had made use of infor-
mation about viewers. Although several of our questions had
free-form text fields, few of our respondents filled them in.
Preferences for different contexts
The final section was about hypothetical sharing of viewers’
personal attributes with the publisher (full name, location,
profession, relationship with the viewer or publisher, first
name, age group, and gender) in each of five scenarios for
the viewer survey (dating, fitness, social networking, photos
and location sharing) and in dating and social networking for
the publisher survey. As only the data for the social network
and dating scenarios on the viewer survey was interesting, we
removed the other scenarios from the publisher survey to re-
duce the burden on our respondents. In this paper we analyze
only the common scenarios to both surveys.
Survey instruments
The survey instruments are available as supplementary mate-
rials.
Ethical considerations
Participants were compensated $2 for a 20-minute study ($6
an hour). Both surveys were designed to collect no personally
identifying information The pilots ensured that the advertised
time of 20 minutes was a high estimate. Our organization’s
ethics board approved the survey and study design.
Recruitment and Validation
Respondents for both surveys were recruited from Mechani-
cal Turk for a “20-min survey on online social networking.”
To minimize self-selection, privacy was not mentioned in any
of the recruitment material.
Responses were screened based on the following criteria:
participants were required to be 1) residents of the United
States for at least five years to control cultural variations [16];
2) 18 years of age or older; 3) current users of Facebook
and LinkedIn; 4) ‘workers’ of MTurk with an approval rat-
ing of at least 95% to ensure a higher quality of responses.
Respondents who 1) correctly answered all attention-check
questions; and 2) entered the correct random response code as
generated by the survey instrument were included in the data
analysis. Respondents who answered one attention-check
question wrong were compensated, but their data was ex-
cluded.
We published the surveys in multiple batches at various times
of the day to obtain a diversity of respondents. The viewer-
focused survey was administered from May 6–7, 2015 and
the publisher-version from June 29–July 3, 2015.
Respondents
Following our screening criteria, we received 519 and 543
responses respectively for the viewer and publisher surveys.
After validation, we were left with a sample of N=316 and
N=402 respondents for the viewer- and publisher-focused
surveys respectively for a total of 718 respondents.2 Respon-
dents in both surveys had similar demographics, as detailed in
Table 1. Respondents were gender balanced within five per-
centage points (Male: 52.5% and 47.7% for the viewer and
publisher surveys), predominantly White (77.5% and 80%),
aged 23–39 (73.7% and 65.1%), and had some college or an
undergraduate education (73.7% and 76.3%).
2After running the viewer survey, we shortened the survey a bit to
make it easier on the Amazon MTurk users by removing some of the
scenarios that we decided not to pursue.
Viewer Publisher
Gender
Male 166 (52.5%) 192 (47.7%)
Female 148 (46.8%) 209 (51.9%)
Other 2 1
Age
18–22 32 (10.1%) 51 (12.6%)
23–39 233 (73.7%) 262 (65.1%)
40–49 33 (10.4%) 58 (14.4%)
50–59 15 (4.7%) 23 (5.7%)
60 and over 3 8
Education
No high school 0 1
High school 27 (8.5%) 40 (9.9%)
Some college or 233 (73.7%) 307 (76.3%)
undergrad degree
Masters 30 (9.5%) 43 (10.6%)
Post-graduate 11 (3.5%) 11 (2.7%)
Ethnicity
White 245 (77.5%) 322 (80.0%)
Hispanic or Latino 30 (9.5%) 31(7.7%)
African American 25 (7.9%) 35 (8.7%)
Asian 20 (6.3%) 33 (8.2%)
Other 5 1
Total respondents 316 402
Table 1: Demographics of the respondents in the viewer and publisher
surveys.
Respondents were asked how frequently they checked pro-
files on LinkedIn: 62.9% of viewers and 73.1% of publishers
reported that they visited one profile a month or more, indi-
cating that they were active users. Another 4.4% of viewers
and 2.5% of publishers indicated that they never visited pro-
files. As the privacy implications of our research questions
would affect how frequently one viewed profiles, we retained
all responses.
FINDINGS
We present the findings from each of our two research ques-
tions in the following sections.
Behaviors of Publishers and Viewers
R1: How do publishers currently make use of information
about their viewers, and how do viewers modify their behav-
iors to manage their privacy?
Providing publishers with information about who has viewed
their content has the potential to empower them to create con-
tent tailored for their audience but may also have a chilling
effect on viewer behavior. We report on how the LinkedIn
design impacted respondent behavior. In particular, we are
interested in both past privacy-preserving actions of respon-
dents and situations where sharing or consuming viewer data
was useful.
Awareness
We first look at respondents’ awareness of their viewer-
privacy options for LinkedIn. This awareness is crucial, as
viewers are only likely to take precautionary steps if they are
aware of the potential for privacy loss. Respondents were
asked under what circumstances a fictional content publisher,
Alice, could see the name of someone who viewed her page
on LinkedIn.
Publisher and viewer respondents were mostly aware of the
viewer-privacy options on LinkedIn with 661 (92.1%) re-
sponding that a publisher could ‘sometimes’ or ‘always’ see
who had viewed their profile. Respondents were also aware
that this setting could be controlled with 577 (80.4%) indicat-
ing so.
We then asked them to log into their LinkedIn profiles and
report their current viewer-privacy settings. A majority of
respondents (N=504, 70.3%) had a default setting of full
name and headline visible, 96 (13.4%) had their industry
and title visible, and 117 (16.3%) appeared as an anonymous
viewer. We also asked if they had changed this setting af-
ter viewing it. Of the 85 (11.9%) respondents who made
changes, 76 (89.4%) of them made a change that increased
their anonymity, and three made a change that decreased it.
LinkedIn viewer behaviors
In this section we focus on the 269 (85%) respondents from
the viewer survey who were aware that publishers can see
who has viewed their profile. We focus on these respon-
dents as they were previously aware that their privacy might
be at risk and may have taken action to protect it through self-
censorship of their actions.
We asked them whether they had ever deliberately avoided
viewing someone’s profile because of viewer-privacy con-
cerns. Of the 269 respondents, 100 (37.2%) reported that they
had avoided viewing someone’s profile at least once because
of their visibility while 169 (62.5%) reported that they had
not. We asked why they had avoided viewing someone’s pro-
file, selecting from options shown in Table 2. They were con-
cerned that LinkedIn might send the publisher an automatic
email containing the viewer’s identity as 50% of respondents
reported avoiding viewing someone’s profile for this reason.
They were also concerned that viewing a profile might sig-
nal a personal or professional interest that they didn’t want
to express. LinkedIn advertises itself as a professional net-
working site, so the concerns around expressing interest make
sense. The responses do suggest that LinkedIn viewers are
self-censoring their usage of the system due to privacy con-
cerns.
Viewers on LinkedIn may also find the sharing of viewing in-
formation with publishers to be useful. We asked respondents
if they had ever deliberately viewed someone’s profile on
LinkedIn to cause their name to appear on the list of ‘Who’s
viewed my profile?’ and 43 respondents (16%) answered
‘Yes’. We then followed up with a question asking why they
had deliberately viewed someone’s profile. Responses are
summarized in Table 3. Establishing a professional relation-
ship was indicated by 53.5% of the 43 respondents and estab-
lishing a personal relationship by 32.6%. The deliberate use
of the information-sharing feature shows that respondents are
aware of how this type of information is shared and are at-
tempting to use it to their advantage.
Going back to the 47 respondents who believed that publish-
ers were not able to see any information about viewers, we
asked if they had ever viewed someone’s profile on LinkedIn
and been glad that they accessed it anonymously, and 17 of
Reasons to avoid Frequency
I did not want LinkedIn to email the other person about
my profile visit.
50 (50.0%)
I did not want to reveal a professional interest in the
other person (e.g: potential employer, switching jobs).
28 (28.0%)
I did not want to lead the person into believing there is
a personal relationship that does not exist.
24 (24.0%)
I did not want to reveal a romantic interest in the other
person.
19 (19.0%)
Interacting with this person might reveal something
about me I do not want to disclose.
15 (15.0%)
I wanted to pretend I never received a connection re-
quest.
14 (14.0%)
I haven’t responded to a correspondence from this per-
son and don’t want to let them know I have logged into
LinkedIn.
14 (14.0%)
I don’t want people to know I am checking LinkedIn
at that time of day, or day of week.
14 (14.0%)
I did not want to lead the person into believing there is
a professional relationship that does not exist.
13 (13.0%)
I did not want this person showing up on my news feed. 11 (11.0%)
To not show someone that they are being ignored 4 (4.0%)
Other 6 (6.0%)
N =100
Table 2: Reasons why respondents avoided viewing other peoples’ pro-
files.
Reason Frequency
To establish a professional relationship 23 (53.5%)
To reveal an existing professional interest 16 (37.2%)
To establish a personal relationship 14 (32.6%)
To show that a connection request was received 12 (27.9%)
To reveal an aspect that I want to promote about myself 12 (27.9%)
To have LinkedIn email the other person 10 (23.3%)
To show the other person that I am following them 9 (20.9%)
To show that I logged in at that time 4 (9.3%)
To show that I can log in at that time 1 (2.3%)
To have them show up on my news feed 7 (16.3%)
To reveal an existing romantic interest 3 (7.0%)
N = 43
Table 3: Top reasons why users deliberately viewed a profile on LinkedIn
to cause their name to appear.
the 47 respondents (36.2%) answered ‘Yes’. Again, we asked
respondents to select relevant reasons. The main reasons
given were relating to relationships, with five (29.4%) not
wanting to show a non-existing personal relationship, nine
(52.9%) not wanting to show a non-existing professional re-
lationship, and five (29.4%) not wanting to show an exist-
ing professional relationship. When asked if they had ever
visited someone’s profile and wished that the other person
had known that they had visited, one participant out of the
47 responded that they had. They said that they wished that
LinkedIn had emailed the person about their visit.
LinkedIn publisher behaviors
In the publisher survey, 392 (97.5%) participants indicated
that a publisher could ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’ see the names
of people who visited their page. Only 10 indicated that pub-
lishers could ‘never’ see the names of people viewing their
page. The 392 respondents who understood that viewer in-
formation was potentially visible to publishers were asked:
“In what ways have you made use of the information about
‘Who’s viewed your profile’ page of your LinkedIn account?”
Reasons Frequency
I visited a viewer’s profile 277 (71%)
I researched a viewer online (e.g., web search,
looked them up on Facebook, etc.)
138 (35%)
I sent a viewer a connection request 109 (28%)
I directly communicated with a viewer (e.g., email,
private LinkedIn message, etc.)
72 (18.4%)
I changed my privacy settings 57 (14.5%)
I asked someone else about this person 53 (13.5%)
I have never made use of such information 47 (12.0%)
I recommended or endorsed a viewer 38 (9.7%)
I blocked or reported a viewer 17 (4.3%)
I shared the profile of a viewer with somebody else 16 (4.1%)
I removed a viewer from my list of connections 14 (3.6%)
I saved the profile of a viewer (e.g., saved to PDF) 7 (1.2%)
N = 392
Table 4: Ways in which participants have made use of the ‘Who’s viewed
your profile’ page of LinkedIn
Table 4 shows the list of the possible responses; participants
could select as many as they wished.
The majority of participants (N=277, 70.7%) indicated that
they had visited a viewer’s profile; 138 (35.2%) had re-
searched a viewer online; and 109 (27.9%) had sent a con-
nection request to the viewer. Behaviors reported by approxi-
mately 10–20% of the participants included directly commu-
nicating with the viewer (18.4%), changing their privacy set-
tings (14.5%), asking someone else about a viewer (13.5%),
and recommending or endorsing a viewer (9.7%). Some re-
spondents reported more extreme behaviors such as blocking
or reporting the viewer (4.3%) and removing a viewer from
their list of connections (3.6%).
Gender and viewer behaviors
Gender was a significant indicator for several viewer-privacy
behaviors. Women were statistically more likely than men
(47% vs. 29%) to avoid viewing a LinkedIn profile because
of the ‘Who has viewed my profile?’ feature (χ2 = 9.0, df =
1, p = 0.003).
Viewer-Privacy Needs
Although the findings in the previous subsection focused on
actual behaviors in a specific social network (LinkedIn), here
we investigate publishers’ desires for information and view-
ers’ willingness to provide such information.
R2: To what degree a) do publishers find various attributes
of viewers ‘useful’; b) do publishers believe these attributes
should be ‘required’; and c) are viewers comfortable reveal-
ing these attributes?
In this section of the survey, we asked both the viewer and
publisher respondents to provide feedback on accessing or
revealing various types of information about viewers in two
distinct hypothetical scenarios: dating and social networking.
These scenarios represent two common contexts in which a
user might desire privacy but might also benefit from sharing
information.
For the dating and social networking scenarios, respondents
were asked to imagine a website where profile publishers
could see some information about the individuals who had
viewed their profile. Both groups were provided with a list of
viewer information and asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale
how comfortable they would be with sharing the information
(viewer survey), if viewers should be required to provide the
information (publisher survey), and whether the information
would be useful (publisher survey). The results are shown in
Figure 2. For brevity we refer to the types of information
shared about a person as ‘attributes’.
For both surveys, we performed a Friedman test on each sce-
nario to determine if there were any statistically significant
differences in responses between the attributes. If so, pair-
wise Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were used to test for indi-
vidual differences. We selected an α of 0.05. A total of 116
pairwise tests were performed, and a Bonferroni correction
was applied. All effects are reported at a 0.00043 (α/116)
level of significance. To minimize the risk of falsely reject-
ing true findings, we also performed a Benjamini-Hochberg
(B-H) correction for comparison.
Dating
Friedman tests revealed that at least one statistically signifi-
cant difference exists between attributes for both publishers
and viewers in the dating scenario (χ2 = 809.6 for viewers,
χ2 = 554.13 for publishers, d.o.f=6, p < 0.00001). Pairwise
tests for viewers showed that they were all statistically differ-
ent from each other except for the difference between Loca-
tion and Relationship with viewer. For publishers (Table 5),
most pairwise tests were statistically significant, except for
Full Name with Location and Relationship, Profession with
Relationship, and First Name with Gender.
Figure 2 depicts dating site viewers’ comfort with sharing at-
tributes (a), publishers’ opinion that attributes should be re-
quired (c), and how useful publishers’ consider the attributes
(e). We make the following important observations from Fig-
ure 2. Note that the attributes that appear in bold are situa-
tions where publishers and viewers had similar opinions and
are therefore good candidates for the ‘Who’s viewed me?’
feedback.
1. Publishers find most attributes to be potentially useful, yet
they do not feel that all attributes should be required, ex-
hibiting a level of viewer privacy respect.
2. Publishers think that First Name, Age Group, and Gender
should be required, and viewers are comfortable revealing
these attributes. Viewers’ comfort levels for sharing these
attributes are significantly different from other attributes,
with moderate to large effect sizes indicating that these dif-
ferences are meaningful. We thus argue that First Name,
Age Group, and Gender are good candidates for sharing
in a ‘Who’s viewed me?’ type listing on a dating site.
3. While publishers tend to agree that Full Name and Loca-
tion should be required, viewers lean towards not disclos-
ing location, and significantly more so with Full Name.
Thus we strongly advise designers of such systems against
sharing viewers’ Full Names on dating sites even though
publishers find it useful. We also advise against sharing
location information of viewers and designers should con-
sider privacy controls such as the granularity of a location.
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Figure 2: For the dating and social networking (SN) scenarios how comfortable viewers were with sharing attributes (a,b), how much publishers felt the
data should be required to be shared (c,d), and how useful publishers found the data (e,f).
4. Publishers tend to agree that Relationship with Publisher
and Profession should be required, and viewers tend to feel
comfortable sharing this. Although not significant with the
Bonferroni correction, the comfort levels between sharing
Location and Relationship with Publisher are significantly
different by the B-H correction, albeit with a small effect
size. The difference between comfort levels in sharing Lo-
cation and Profession is significant with a medium effect
size. Thus, we advise designers of such systems that it
is useful and acceptable to share Relationship, and even
more acceptable to share Profession (the difference is sta-
tistically significant with a low effect size).
Social Networks
Friedman tests showed statistically significant differences be-
tween attributes for both publishers and viewers in the social
networking scenario (χ2 = 347, p < 0.00001 for viewers and
χ2 = 449, p < 0.00001 for publishers). Pairwise tests are
shown in Table 6.
In particular, we observe the following:
1. Viewers are generally comfortable revealing all attributes
but are more comfortable revealing First Name, Age
Group, and Gender than Full Name and Location (medium
effect size) for which they are more neutral. Attitudes for
Relationship with Publisher and Profession lie in between.
2. Publishers indicated a stronger preference that First Name
be required and statistically significantly weaker prefer-
ences (with medium effect sizes) for Full Name and Re-
lationship with Poster to be required. Viewers were statis-
tically significantly more comfortable with revealing Re-
lationship with Poster than Full Name (with a medium
effect size). We thus advise designers of such systems
that it is useful and acceptable to share the First Name
of viewers and only marginally useful and acceptable to
share the viewer’s Relationship with Poster. Other at-
tributes (Gender, Age Group, Location, and Profession),
although apparently acceptable from the viewers’ perspec-
Categories T-stat P-value Effect
Viewer
Full Name (2) < Location (3) 3989 < 0.0001*† -0.28
Full Name (2) < Profession (4) 2245 < 0.0001*† -0.55
Full Name (2) < Relationship (3) 2913.5 < 0.0001*† -0.43
Full Name (2) < First Name (4) 176.5 < 0.0001*† -0.72
Full Name (2) < Age Group (4) 509.5 < 0.0001*† -0.73
Full Name (2) < Gender (5) 435.5 < 0.0001*† -0.75
Location (3) < Profession (4) 3684 < 0.0001*† -0.35
Location (3) < Relationship (3) 6140.5 0.001† -0.18
Location (3) < First Name (4) 2290 < 0.0001*† -0.58
Location (3) < Age Group (4) 1035 < 0.0001*† -0.68
Location (3) < Gender (5) 401 < 0.0001*† -0.72
Profession (4) > Relationship (3) 7641 < 0.0001*† -0.23
Profession (4) < First Name (4) 2838.5 < 0.0001*† -0.43
Profession (4) < Age Group (4) 1472.5 < 0.0001*† -0.59
Profession (4) < Gender (5) 570 < 0.0001*† -0.69
Relationship (3) < First Name (4) 1479 < 0.0001*† -0.57
Relationship (3) < Age Group (4) 899.5 < 0.0001*† -0.65
Relationship (3) < Gender (5) 415.5 < 0.0001*† -0.72
First Name (4) < Age Group (4) 926.5 < 0.0001*† -0.27
First Name (4) < Gender (5) 233.5 < 0.0001*† -0.44
Age Group (4) < Gender (5) 136.5 < 0.0001*† -0.33
Publisher
Full Name (4) < Location (4) 4968.5 < 0.0001*† -0.23
Full Name (4) > Profession (3) 8146 0.03† -0.11
Full Name (4) = Relationship (4) 8284 0.749 -0.02
Full Name (4) < First Name (4) 1109.5 < 0.0001*† -0.47
Full Name (4) < Age Group (4) 971 < 0.0001*† -0.52
Full Name (4) < Gender (5) 507.5 < 0.0001*† -0.54
Location (4) > Profession (3) 11612 < 0.0001*† -0.35
Location (4) > Relationship (4) 11202 < 0.0001*† -0.22
Location (4) < First Name (4) 2672.5 < 0.0001*† -0.31
Location (4) < Age Group (4) 872 < 0.0001*† -0.44
Location (4) < Gender (5) 966.5 < 0.0001*† -0.47
Profession (3) < Relationship (4) 3830.5 0.006† -0.14
Profession (3) < First Name (4) 1523.5 < 0.0001*† -0.53
Profession (3) < Age Group (4) 651.5 < 0.0001*† -0.59
Profession (3) < Gender (5) 729 < 0.0001*† -0.6
Relationship (4) < First Name (4) 2237.5 < 0.0001*† -0.47
Relationship (4) < Age Group (4) 1208.5 < 0.0001*† -0.54
Relationship (4) < Gender (5) 950 < 0.0001*† -0.56
First Name (4) = Age Group (4) 1177 0.003 -0.15
First Name (4) < Gender (5) 1042 < 0.0001*† -0.24
Age Group (4) < Gender (5) 291.5 0.033 -0.11
Table 5: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test results for Dating, showing differ-
ences (median values reported) in a) comfort levels of viewers with dis-
closing attributes and b) agreement levels of publishers for requiring
attributes. Differences significant after the Bonferroni correction are in-
dicated with a ‘*’; differences significant after the B-H correction are
indicated with a ‘†’. The direction of the difference is indicated by ‘<’,
‘>’, or ‘=’.
tive, were not generally required by publishers and could
be suppressed for better viewer privacy.
Gender differences
We compared the preferences for both viewers and publishers
when split by gender, summarizing the findings in Table 7.
We make the following observations:
1. Female viewers in the dating scenario were statistically sig-
nificantly less likely than males (with low to medium effect
sizes) to be comfortable sharing various attributes (all at-
tributes by the B-H correction).
2. At the same time, female publishers in this scenario were
more likely to feel these attributes should be required.
These differences are statistically significant (with low to
Categories T-stat P-value Effect
Viewer
Full Name (4) > Location (3) 4785.5 0.033† -0.12
Full Name (4) < Profession (4) 1446 0*† -0.22
Full Name (4) < Relationship (4) 1363.5 < 0.0001*† -0.26
Full Name (4) < First Name (4) 419.5 < 0.0001*† -0.45
Full Name (4) < Age Group (4) 833.5 < 0.0001*† -0.47
Full Name (4) < Gender (4) 352 < 0.0001*† -0.54
Location (3) < Profession (4) 1119 < 0.0001*† -0.33
Location (3) < Relationship (4) 2329.5 < 0.0001*† -0.32
Location (3) < First Name (4) 1266 < 0.0001*† -0.45
Location (3) < Age Group (4) 450.5 < 0.0001*† -0.53
Location (3) < Gender (4) 197.5 < 0.0001*† -0.58
Profession (4) = Relationship (4) 1675 0.387 -0.05
Profession (4) < First Name (4) 1157 < 0.0001*† -0.28
Profession (4) < Age Group (4) 820 < 0.0001*† -0.37
Profession (4) < Gender (4) 269 < 0.0001*† -0.48
Relationship (4) < First Name (4) 618.5 < 0.0001*† -0.28
Relationship (4) < Age Group (4) 841 < 0.0001*† -0.36
Relationship (4) < Gender (4) 283.5 < 0.0001*† -0.47
First Name (4) = Age Group (4) 1014.5 0.017 -0.13
First Name (4) < Gender (4) 438 < 0.0001*† -0.29
Age Group (4) < Gender (4) 28.5 < 0.0001*† -0.25
Publisher
Full Name (3) > Location (2) 18225 < 0.0001*† -0.48
Full Name (3) > Profession (2) 18718 < 0.0001*† -0.51
Full Name (3) > Relationship (3) 9356.5 0.012† -0.13
Full Name (3) < First Name (4) 3394.5 < 0.0001*† -0.25
Full Name (3) < Age Group (3) 11859.5 < 0.0001*† -0.29
Full Name (3) < Gender (3) 9532 < 0.0001*† -0.23
Location (2) = Profession (2) 5065.5 0.457 -0.04
Location (2) < Relationship (3) 2414 < 0.0001*† -0.43
Location (2) < First Name (4) 1601 < 0.0001*† -0.58
Location (2) < Age Group (3) 3795 < 0.0001*† -0.28
Location (2) < Gender (3) 3089 < 0.0001*† -0.34
Profession (2) < Relationship (3) 1730 < 0.0001*† -0.44
Profession (2) < First Name (4) 859 < 0.0001*† -0.61
Profession (2) < Age Group (3) 2329.5 < 0.0001*† -0.3
Profession (2) < Gender (3) 2089 < 0.0001*† -0.36
Relationship (3) < First Name (4) 2407 < 0.0001*† -0.37
Relationship (3) > Age Group (3) 9536 < 0.0001*† -0.21
Relationship (3) > Gender (3) 8143.5 0.014† -0.12
First Name (4) > Age Group (3) 15170.5 < 0.0001*† -0.53
First Name (4) > Gender (3) 13247.5 < 0.0001*† -0.49
Age Group (3) < Gender (3) 1093.5 0.008† -0.13
Table 6: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test results for Social Networks, show-
ing differences (median values reported) in a) comfort levels of viewers
with disclosing attributes and b) agreement levels of publishers for re-
quiring attributes.
medium effect sizes) for Location using the Bonferroni
correction, and for Profession and First Name as well when
using the B-H correction.
3. We did not observe any meaningful, or statistically signif-
icant, differences in the social networking scenario. We
omit details of those tests.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our work makes several useful contributions in the context of
privacy of viewers in social networks. We found evidence of
chilling effects on viewers, mostly due to fear of sending un-
wanted emails or inadvertent signaling. We found evidence of
users viewing profiles to signal interest deliberately, mostly
to establish a personal or professional relationship, indicat-
ing that viewers use the ‘Who’s viewed me’ feature to their
advantage as well. For dating and social network sites in gen-
eral, we make recommendations on which attributes should
Category T-stat P-value Effect
Viewer Dating
Full Name M (3) > F (2) 16881 < 0.0001*† -0.33
Location M (4) > F (2) 16298 < 0.0001*† -0.29
Profession M (4) > F (3) 15064.5 < 0.0001*† -0.23
Relationship M (3.5) > F (3) 15677 < 0.0001*† -0.25
First Name M (4) > F (4) 14732.5 0.001† -0.18
Age Group M (4) > F (4) 14599.5 0.002† -0.18
Gender M (5) > F (4) 14218.5 0.005† -0.16
Publisher Dating
Full Name M (4) = F (4) 18390.5 0.162 -0.07
Location M (4) < F (4) 15966 < 0.0001*† -0.18
Profession M (3) < F (3) 17260 0.037† -0.1
Relationship M (3) < F (4) 18427 0.199 -0.06
First Name M (4) < F (4) 16743.5 0.004† -0.14
Age Group M (4) < F (5) 17821 0.078 -0.09
Gender M (4) < F (5) 17835 0.113 -0.08
Table 7: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test results for the attributes split by
gender.
be shared because both publishers and viewers value them,
such as First Name, Age Group, and Gender, and which could
be suppressed to enhance viewer privacy as publishers do not
seem to require them, such as Full Name and Location. In ad-
dition we found differences in behavior and preferences based
on gender. Women were more likely than men to avoid view-
ing a profile and were less likely than men to be comfortable
sharing attributes in dating sites, but they were more likely to
want them required as publishers.
Our findings have several implications for the design of social
networking services, which we discuss next.
Balancing Publisher and Viewer Demands
LinkedIn provides a reasonably high level of transparency
compared to other social platforms, but our findings suggest
a number of ways that the utility of these mechanisms can be
enhanced for both publishers and viewers. Although publish-
ers value feedback regarding the viewers of their content, the
degree of feedback desired is by no means set in stone. Fur-
ther, this feedback can have a chilling effect on viewers, po-
tentially decreasing the traffic to publishers’ content. To ad-
dress this, platforms could provide finer-grained preferences
for content providers. This could take the form of altering
the amount of information collected (e.g., details of individ-
ual viewers vs. aggregate view data), as well as whom data is
collected from (e.g., “Record the names of recruiters viewing
my profile, and aggregate counts of academics who view my
profile”). These mechanisms would allow publishers to fine-
tune the feedback collected to better meet their needs, while
potentially reducing the chilling effects imparted to (classes
of) viewers. Of course, reducing chilling effects will require
providing viewers with feedback regarding what will be col-
lected by visiting a particular profile.
A key finding from our study was that the chilling effects
felt by viewers stem, in large part, from a desire to avoid
unwanted signaling. This can be addressed by making sig-
naling a first-class action within social platforms. Bapna et
al. previously found that weak signals are an important com-
ponent in facilitating interaction on dating websites [3]. Our
work similarly shows that people consider signaling to be
an important part of networking sites like LinkedIn for var-
ious reasons such as showing professional and personal in-
terest in another person. Unfortunately, privacy settings for
viewer privacy are currently coarse-grained and implemented
through ‘reciprocity’ or ‘tit-for-tat’ policies, where publishers
and viewers exchange the same degree of information about
each other when viewing each other’s profiles.
We envision at least three ways to improve current mecha-
nisms for viewer privacy. First, viewers could be allowed
to alter their profile viewing options (i.e., visible vs. pri-
vate/anonymous mode) on a per-user basis. For instance, an
academic pondering a career change might wish to browse
corporate profiles anonymously while browsing the profiles
of other academics in visible mode. Second, the semantics
of anonymous mode could be made more fine-grained. Cur-
rently, switching to anonymous mode in LinkedIn completely
clears a user’s viewer history. One option for a more flexible
alternative is that entering anonymous mode means that fu-
ture viewer history will not be recorded for profiles visited
in anonymous mode, but existing history is preserved. If a
profile is later visited in visible mode, viewer history could
again be recorded for future views made by the owner of that
profile. Third, platforms could provide an alternative to a full
view action by enabling viewers to ‘peek’ at a limited view of
a profile or other content without signaling to the publisher.
For instance, a LinkedIn user might allow anonymous ‘peeks’
to the (more limited) public version of their profile, but re-
quire data collection to see their full profile. These sugges-
tions can improve the exposure feedback mechanisms in the
context of location sharing suggested by Tsai et al. [39] (e.g.,
anonymous peeks at limited amounts of audit log data) and
Schlegel et al. [35] (e.g., the eyes interface can reveal names
for certain types of information access).
The above design suggestions only scratch the surface of this
rich space but illustrate that minor enhancements to the feed-
back mechanisms deployed by platforms like LinkedIn have
the potential to enhance the experience of both publishers
and viewers. By leveraging publishers’ reported flexibility
regarding what data they collect and acting on viewers’ de-
sires for more explicit signaling, platforms could increase
the exposure of publishers’ content while decreasing the (un-
wanted) exposure of viewers’ private information.
Gender Differences
We found that female respondents were much more likely to
avoid viewing a profile than male respondents due to con-
cerns related to what signal this viewing action might appear
to send. This finding suggests that controls for weak signal-
ing may be especially useful to women, who may otherwise
experience a stronger chilling effect because of the ‘Who’s
viewed me’ feature.
We also found gender differences in how male and female re-
spondents were willing to share data in an online dating ser-
vice. As has been reported previously [14, 20, 38], women are
more concerned about revealing their location and other per-
sonal details than men, and it follows that they would also be
more concerned, in general, at revealing identifiable informa-
tion on a dating site. This, again, suggests that emphasizing
mechanisms for weak signaling may be especially useful to
women, in this case due to preferences against strict recipro-
cal sharing. Indeed, this finding provides another strong mo-
tivation to move away from reciprocal (‘tit-for-tat’) sharing
policies, which may disproportionately disadvantage women
by either eroding their privacy or inducing a chilling effect on
their participation.
Our findings suggest that a deeper study is needed on gender
differences, as women may be adversely impacted by these
mechanisms.
Limitations
Our findings are based on self-reported behaviors and atti-
tudes of U.S. participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) service. Users in general have difficulty accurately
recalling their past behaviors [28], and although we endeav-
ored to support recognition of potential behaviors over recall,
respondents may have had difficulty accurately recalling past
activities. Although MTurk provides a sample of the U.S.
population, it has several important biases. Kang et al. found
that U.S. Turk workers were “younger and better educated,”
“put a higher value on anonymity and hiding information,”
and “had more privacy concerns than the larger U.S. public”
[15, 34, 26]. Future studies would need to triangulate our
findings using other methods that reach marginalized or tech-
nologically removed groups (such as the elderly and people
in rural areas and developing countries).
Our survey asks about user’s experiences on LinkedIn and
may not extend to other social networks. Although some re-
spondents may not have participated in a dating social net-
work, we felt that enough of them would be able to imagine
what features they may desire in one.
Some of the differences between MTurk workers and the gen-
eral population are beneficial for this survey topic. In a gen-
eral survey it would be challenging to find a sufficiently large
sample of people who were aware of LinkedIn’s reciprocal
sharing of information to be able to study issues such as chill-
ing effects. Surveying MTurkers provides insights into the
types of chilling effects experienced by privacy-conscious in-
dividuals.
Using MTurk leads to other important concerns related to fa-
tigue and lack of attention. We addressed this through the use
of attention checks, which have been shown to increase data
reliability [31]. Finally, the complexity of the survey required
that it be spread throughout a longer time frame than may
have been ideal. We are aware of no events that may have al-
tered our respondent’s viewpoints between surveys, and sim-
ilar questions from each had similar statistical distributions.
CONCLUSIONS
We surveyed two samples of the adult U.S. population to
study the privacy concerns and behaviors of people viewing
(N=316) and publishing (N=402) information on social net-
works. We found that the visibility of viewing behaviors had a
chilling effect on participants, who deliberately avoided view-
ing profiles out of concern for their own privacy. At the same
time, we find that publishers are mindful of viewer privacy
concerns even though they find information about their view-
ers useful. Finally, we found gender differences, especially in
the context of viewer privacy on dating sites, where women
were less comfortable sharing certain kinds of information as
viewers while also being more likely as publishers to desire
the same information from their viewers.
Our work shows that building a safe, inviting online space
requires balancing the privacy and utility needs of both pub-
lishers and viewers. Providing feedback about visitors al-
lows publishers to understand their privacy ‘exposure’, but
too much information about viewers can impinge on viewers’
privacy and result in a chilling effect. Our findings also shed
light on the types of information viewers are comfortable re-
vealing in different circumstances, how gender may play a
role in their viewer privacy attitudes, and design implications
for making inroads to addressing these issues. We hope that
our work spurs further research in analyzing the privacy be-
haviors and needs of viewers, and the design of privacy set-
tings and mechanisms to balance the privacy needs of both
viewers and publishers of information.
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